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THE FEDERAL AMENDING POWER
THE FEDERAL AMENDING POWER:
GENESIS AND JUSTICIABILITY t
By LESTER B. ORFIELD*
Genesis of Article Five'
T HE idea of amending the organic instrument of a state is
peculiarly American. Although many of our political and
legal institutions take their origin from English and occasionally
Continental conceptions, such is not the case in the fundamental
matter of altering the constitution. The idea of a written consti-
tution was developed at a late stage of Western civilization, and
the United States, not Europe, took the lead. The doctrine of
popular sovereignty had an especially strong appeal to the in-
habitants of the colonies in the latter half of the eighteenth
century. The people were sovereign: it followed that they could
make a constitution. Corollary to this, of course, they could
revise and amend the document which they had adopted.
The first written charters or constitutions providing for their
amendment appear to have been the charters of the Colony of
Pennsylvania, which was the only colony to make such provision.-
Eight of the state constitutions during the period between the
declaration of independence and the meeting of the constitutional
convention of 1787 contained amendment clauses. Even more
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Ne-
braska.
tThis article was written as a Research Fellow, University of Michigan
School of Law, under the direction of Dean Henry M. Bates.
2U. S. Const. Article five is as follows:
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the applica-
tion of the legislatures of tsvo thirds of the several states, shall call a
convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case. shall be valid
to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by
the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be
made prior to the year one thousand eight hundi'ed and eight shall in any
manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate."22Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Organic Charter, and
Other Organic Laws, 2nd ed., p. 1518, 1527, 1531, 1536.
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important, the articles of confederation, defective as they were,
made provision for their alteration. It was almost inevitable,
therefore, that when the constitutional convention assembled some
plan of revision would be presented.
The constitutional convention assembled on May 14, 1787,
and at the meeting of May 29, Randolph presented the first plan
for a new constitution in the form of fifteen resolutions.' The
thirteenth declared that provision should be made for amendment
of the constitution whenever thought necessary and that the assent
of the national legislature should not be required. Charles Pinck-
ney presented a proposed draft of a constitution at the same
meeting.4 Article sixteen of his draft set forth that if the legis-
latures of two thirds of the states should apply for a conventoion
to amend the constitution, the national legislature should call one;
or, in the alternative, Congress by a two-thirds vote of each
house might propose, and two thirds of the legislatures might
adopt. Both drafts were referred to the committee of the whole
house.
On June 5, the convention discussed Randolph's resolution.'
Pinckney expressed doubt as to the propriety or need of an amend-
ment clause. Gerry defended it, however, on the grounds that
such a new and difficult experiment required periodical revision,
that the opportunity for such revision would stabilize the govern-
ment, and that "nothing had yet happened in the states where the
provision existed to prove its impropriety." Randolph's resolution
was again brought up on June 9.0 Several members thought it
not a necessity; they furthermore thought it improper to dispense
with the consent of Congress. Mason was of the opinion that the
provision was necessary since the constitution, like the articles of
confederation, would prove defective. It would be better to pro-
vide for amendments in an easy constitutional way than to rely
on chance and violence. He was opposed to having Congress par-
ticipate in the process since it might abuse its power and refuse
to give its assent to changes desired. The resolution was unan-
imously adopted, but the clause dispensing with the consent of
Congress was postponed for further discussion.
A long interval now occurred during which the convention ap-
pears to have ignored or overlooked the question of an amending
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clause.' Randolph's original resolution, except as to congressional
participation in amending, seems to have been the basis of action
until August 6, when Rutledge of the committee of detail, to
whom the resolution had been referred, delivered their report."
Article nineteen of their draft provided that Congress should call
a convention on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds
of the states. There was no discussion of the report until August
30, when Gouverneur Morris suggested that Congress be permitted
to call a convention whenever it chose.0 But the convention
unanimously agreed to the article as reported by the committee.
The most serious and detailed discussion did not occur until
the last week of the convention."0 On September 10, Gerry moved
to reconsider article nineteen. The constitution, he asserted, would
be paramount to the state constitutions. Under the article, two-
thirds of the states could obtain a convention, "a majority of which
can bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the state con-
stitutions altogether." He asked whether such a state of affairs
should be brought about. Hamilton seconded Gerry's motion, but
with a different motive than the latter. He did not object to the
result described by Gerry and contended that it was no worse to
subject the people of the United States to "the major voice," than
to do so to the people of a particular state. He desired an easier
mode of amendment than that provided in the articles of confed-
eration, and regarded article nineteen as inadequate in accomplish-
ing this. Like Gouverneur Morris, he proposed that Congress be
given a free hand in calling a convention.
"The state legislatures will not apply for alterations, but with
a view to increase their own powers. The national legislature will
be the first to perceive, and will be most sensitive to the necessity
of amendments; and ought also to be empowered, whenever two-
thirds of each branch should concur, to call a convention. There
could be no danger in giving this power as the people would
finally decide in the case."
James Madison also supported the motion for reconsideration.
The language concerning the calling of a convention was too vague.
It was not clear how the convention would be formed, nor by what
rules it would transact business, nor what force its acts would
have. The motion to reconsider was thereupon passed, nine states





favoring and one opposing. Sherman moved that Congress be
permitted to propose amendments to the states, "but that no amend-
ment shall be binding until consented to by the several states."
Wilson moved to insert "two-thirds of" before the words "sev-
eral states" in Sherman's proposal. This failed by a five to six
vote, but a later motion by Wilson to insert instead "three fourths
of" was adopted.
Madison then moved to postpone the amended proposition in
order to consider a proposal of his own, worded much like the
present article five providing for proposal of amendments by Con-
gress either on a two thirds vote of each house or on applica-
tion of the legislatures of two thirds of the states, and ratifica-
tion by the legislatures or conventions of three fourths of the
states. Hamilton seconded the motion. This proposal meant a
significant change in the entire scheme. Instead of permitting
amendment by a single convention, the plan made necessary the
participation of the legislatures or conventions of the states. At
this point Rutledge stated that he would never agree to an amend-
ing power "by which the articles relating to slaves might be altered
by the states not interested in that property, and prejudiced against
it." A proviso was then added to Madison's plan to meet this
objection, and his amended proposition was adopted by a vote of
nine to one.
Five days later as the convention was about to conclude its
labors, the amendment clause was reported as article V by the
committee of style and arrangement." Sherman feared that "three
fourths of the states might be brought to do things fatal to par-
ticular states; as abolishing them altogether, or depriving them of
their equality in the Senate." He therefore thought it reasonable
that the limitations on the amending power should be enlarged
so as to provide "that no state should be affected in its internal
police, or deprived of their equality in the Senate."
Mason believed that the proposed method of amending the con-
stitution was "exceptionable and dangerous." Both modes re-
quired action by Congress either immediately or ultimately; hence
no amendment of the proper kind could be obtained by the peo-
pie if the government became oppressive, as he believed would
be the case. Gouverneur Morris and Gerry then moved to amend
the article so as to require a convention on the application of two
115 Elliot, Debates, 1866 ed., 551-552.
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thirds of the states, in order to obviate this objection. Madison
pointed out in response that he did not see why Congress would
not be as much obligated to propose amendments applied for by
two thirds of the states, as to call a convention on a similar appli-
cation. He was not unalterably opposed to providing for a con-
vention, but thought that difficulties might arise as to the form
and quorum, matters which should be avoided in constitutional
regulations. The motion for a convention was, however, unan-
imously adopted. Sherman moved to amend article five so as to
require ratification of amendments by all state legislatures or con-
ventions instead of three fourths of them, but his motion failed,
seven to three. Gerry moved to amend so as to allow ratification
only by the state legislatures and not by state conventions as an
alternative method, but this failed, ten to one.
One last attempt was made to limit the amending power.
Sherman in accordance with his previously expressed idea moved
to annex at the end of the article a clause that "no state shall
without its consent, be affected in its internal police, or deprived
of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Madison objected that if
such special provisos were added every state would insist on
them, for their boundaries, exports, and other matters. Sherman's
motion then failed, eight to three, the small states, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Delaware voting for it. He then moved to
strike out article five altogether, and this motion also failed, by
an eight to two vote. Gouverneur Morris moved to annex the
simple proviso, as it now appears in article five, "that no state,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate." And as Elliot concisely reports it, this motion, "being
dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small states, was agreed
to without debate, no one opposing it, or the question, saying no."
At this same meeting the entire constitution as amended was ac-
cepted by the convention, and ordered to be engrossed. Two days
later on Monday, September 17, the engrossed constitution was
read and signed, and the convention adjourned.
JUSTICIABILITY OF AMENDMENTS
Is the question of the validity of an amendment a legal ques-
tion? Or is it a political question? If it be a political question,
it would lie in the sphere of the political department,-the legis-
lative or the executive, or both.
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To one not particularly familiar with constitutional law the
notion of a court's passing on the legality of a constitutional
amendment may seem strange. To such it would perhaps seem
correct that the courts should unquestionably assume the validity
of the constitution and its amendments as an irreducible minimum
in the decision of cases. To a Continental lawyer accustomed to
a legal system in which the courts may not declare even a statute
invalid, the idea of a court's determining whether or not a con-
stitutional amendment is valid or not would seem astonishing.
Even one familiar with American constitutional law might well
have had some doubts before the litigation over the legality of the
eighteenth and nineteenth amendments. The only previous in-
stance in which the Supreme Court of the United States had
passed on the legitimacy of an amendment to the federal consti-
tution had arisen more than a century previously in the case of
Hollingsworth v. Virginia,12 as to the adoption of the eleventh
amendment. In that case the attorney general of the United
States who defended its legality made no attempt to show that it
was a political question, and the court did not discuss the ques-
tion. The case can therefore be cited only to the effect that the
court and the parties assumed it to be a legal question. The court
moreover passed only on the legality of the procedure of amend-
ment, and not on the content of the amendment itself. In the later
and much cited case of Luther v. Borden, 3 the Supreme Court
declared in dictum that the question of the validity of the adop-
tion of an amendment was a political question. This case attracted
great attention and was widely cited in the state decisions, so
that many came to have the view that the question was political.
Last of all, inasmuch as the courts have not assumed to pass on
the constitutionality of the constitution itself, there is some logic
in arguing that since an amendment becomes as much a part of
the constitution as any other part of it, in fact repeals any part
inconsistent with it, as a result, the legality of an amendment is
no more open to attack than that of the constitution itself.
12(1798) 3 Dal. (U.S.) 378, 1 L. Ed. 644.
13(1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 1, 39, 12 L. Ed. 581. Taney, C. J. said:
"In forming the constitutions of the different states, after the Decla-
tion of Independence, and in the various changes and.alterations which have
since been made, the political department has always determined whether
the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people
of the state, and the judicial power has followed its decision." As late
as 1888 it was asserted that- this case "is still the law of the federal
courts" in Smith v. Good, (C.C.R.I. 1888) 34 Fed. 204.
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It may be laid down dogmatically that the constitutionality of
the constitution itself is a political question.14 In the first place
it would seem a contradiction in terms to raise such a question,
except in reference to the matter of its having been validly adopted
according to the previously existing constitution. Where the ex-
isting constitution has come into operation through a revolution,
obviously a very dangerous problem would arise if the courts
should attempt to pass on the validity of the new constitution.
Where the new constitution has not been the result of a revolution,
a new government has not begun to function under the new con-
stitution, the people have not acquiesced, and the old courts hang
over, they could declare the new constitution void.15 If a new
government had commenced to operate under the new constitution
and there was popular acquiescence, or if simply a new govern-
ment, executive and legislative, had taken their oaths under the
new constitution, it would perhaps be logically possible for the
old courts to declare the new constitution invalid. But where
14Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581; Smith v.
Good, (C.C.R.I. 1888) 34 Fed. 204; Brickhouse v. Brooks, (C.C.Va.
1908) 165 Fed. 534; Dorr's case in 2 Wharton, Criminal Law, 5th ed.,
sec. 2777; State v. Starling, (1867) 15 Rich. L. (S. C.) 120; Koehler v.
Hill, (1883) 60 Iowa 543, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609; Miller v. Johnson,
(1892) 92 Ky. 589, 18 S. W. 522, 15 L. R. A. 524, constitution held valid
although the convention elected to draft it made several changes in it
after it had been voted on by the people of the state; Taylor v. Common-
wealth, (1903) 101 Va. 829, 44 S. E. 754, constitution upheld though it
had never been submitted to popular vote; Carpenter v. Cornish, (1912) 83
N. J. L. 696, 85 Atl. 240, affirming 83 N. J. L 254, 83 Ati. 31 ; O'Neill, J.,
dissenting in Foley v. Democratic Parish Committee, (1915) 132 La. 220, 70
So. 204. "When, however, a state government has been formed, and the
state admitted to the Union with a given constitution, courts must recog-
nize, and are as fully bound by, the fact as the merest citizen; and I sub-
mit, with all respect, that we can as well dispute the validity of the United
States constitution, because the convention framing it, disregarding all
instructions limiting its members to making amendments to the old articles
of confederation, assumed to make an entirely new form of government, as
can we inquire into any supposed irregularities or illegalities which may
have entered into the construction of our own." Brittle v. People, (1873)
2 Neb. 198, 210.
l5Loring v. Young, (1921) 239 Mass. 349, 132 N. E. 65. The paucity
of precedent on this point seems to have led to the broad view frequently
asserted that the validity of a constitution is not assailable at any stage.
In 15 L. R. A. 524. the commentator on Miller v. Johnson, (1892) 92 Ky.
589, -18 S. W. 522, 15 L. R. A. 524, points, out that since there is no
question of opposing governments, or of the existence of the court and
since the adoption of a new constitution is in effect only an amedment of
the old one, and does not in fact upset the existing government, "it is
difficult to see why the question of lawful adoption is not as much a judicial
question in case of a new constitution as it is in the case of an amendment,
eo nomine."
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the courts, as well as the other branches of the government, are
operating under the new constitution, it seems inconceivable that
they could pass on the validity of the instrument which is their
creator. In theory, the court might decide the new constitution
was invalid. But this would be tantamount to a declaration that
the court itself no longer exists, since it was the creature of the
constitution. The futility of the proceeding would make such a
decision unlikely. As an actual fact such a court might continue
to exist if the other departments of government accepted and en-
forced the decision, but this would seem to be a case of usurpation.
From the fact that the courts cannot declare the existing con-
stitution invalid, it logically follows that they cannot so declare any
part of it (exclusive of amendments),." In fact, to do this would
seem even less justifiable than to nullify the whole new constitu-
tion, for in recognizing part of a new constitution it must recognize
its entire validity. Since the old constitution is no longer in ex-
istence, there is no authority on which it can predicate a declara-
tion that a part of the new constitution is invalid.
The view that the courts may not declare the existing consti-
tution or a part of it (exclusive of amendments) invalid has par-
ticular force as to the federal constitution. In the case of the
states many of them have adopted wholly new constitutions in
pursuance, in most cases, of the mode prescribed in the previous
constitution. In such cases there is doubtless justification for
the courts' passing on the validity of the new constitution, though
as a matter of fact such cases have been very rare. But the con-
stitution of the United States was not adopted according to the
mode prescribed in the article of confederation. In other words,
our existing constitution is the product of a revolution, bloodless
though it was.1 7  The Supreme Court and all the other federal
leCarpenter v. Cornish, (1912) 83 N. J. L. 696, 85 Atl. 240. Lut this
view seems to have been departed from in a number of Louisiana cases
arising over the 1920 state constitution. Huff v. Selber, (D.C. La. 1925)
10 F. (2d) 236; Pender v. Gray, (1921) 149 La. 184, 88 So. 786; State v.
Judge, (1921) 149 La. 363, 89 So. 215; State v. Jones, (1922) 151 La.
714, 92 So. 310. An earlier case State v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
(1915) 137 La. 507, 68 So. 742, is partially explainable on the ground that
the constitution then made no provision for a convention, that the people
by popular vote adopted the legislative restrictions as to subject-matter
imposed on the convention, and that the constitution was never ratified by
popular vote. O'Neill, J., dissented on the ground that if part of the
constitution could be declared invalid, the whole might be. See also,
Foley v. Democratic Parish Committee, (1915) 138 La. 220, 70 So. 204.
17Jameson says that "it is clear that the act of disregarding the
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courts are and always have been the creatures of the existing
constitution. Thus there has never been any court before whom
its invalidity might be asserted. The federal courts have never
assumed to pass on the validity of the original constitution or
any part of it, and have never admitted that it was the creature
of revolution, though the commentators have frequently pointed
it out.
Passing from the question of judicial cognizance of the validity
of the constitution to that of an amendment thereto, it would not
be illogical to expect somewhat the same treatment of the problem."
The adoption of a constitution and the adoption of an amendment
certainly have many points in common. In both there is the
exercise of the highest sovereign power of the state. The adoption
of an amendment is the adoption of a constitution in little. It is
conceivable that over a long period of time a constitution might
be so altered as to bear little resemblance to the original document.
Looked at from one point of view, an amendment is of even
greater import than the original provisions of the constitution since
it automatically repeals all clauses inconsistent with it." It may
even repeal a Supreme Court decision.20 Looked at from a prac-
provisions of the 13th of the articles of confederation, was done con-
fessedly as an act of revolution, and not as an act within the legal
competence of either the people or the convention, under the consti-
tution then in force." Constitutional Conventions, sec. 564. Under
article XIII, Congress should have proposed ind the legislatures of
every state should have ratified the constitution. Technically, every
step was complied with except that ratification was by three fourths
of the states (though all eventually ratified), inasmuch as the consti-
tutional convention sent the constitution to Congress, which at the
advisory direction of the convention transmitted it to the state legis-
latures, who in turn at the recommendation of the convention passed
it on to the state conventions. The framing of an entirely new
constitution in violation of the directions of Congress and the desig-
nating of the ratifying bodies have been asserted to be revolutionary,
but if the convention be regarded as an advisory body the only illegal
step was ratification by less than a unanimous vote. The ground of
necessity pleaded by Randolph seems a rather dubious legal justifica-
tion. See also, Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 9; 1
Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law 98;
McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 403, 4 L Ed. 579.
1sIn Smith v. Good, (C.C.R.I. 1888) 34 Fed. 204, it is asserted that
both questions are political; while in Loring v. Young, (1921) 239
Mass. 349, 132 N. E. 65 that both are judicial, Luther v. Borden,
(1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, being distinguished on the
ground that in that case two rival governments were arrayed against
each other in armed conflict.
'
9Johnson v. Tompkins, (C.C. Pa. 1833) Baldwin 571. 598. Fed.
Cas. No. 7416; Osborn v. Nicholson, (C.C.Ark. 1871) 1 Dill. 219, Fed.
Cas. No. 10595; University v. McIver, (1875) 72 N. C. 76; Grant v.
Hardage, (1913) 106 Ark. 506, 153 S. V. 826.
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tical standpoint, however, the chief difference is seen to be that
an amendment does not generally produce so comprehensive and
so serious an effect on the existing frame of government. The
courts are left relatively free to see that the prescribed consti-
tutional mode of alterations is complied with.
If the constitution made specific provision for the submission
of the question of the validity of an amendment to a designated
tribunal, it might perhaps be asserted that this is not a question
for the courts,"1 though even this has been doubted.2 - Article
five, however, is silent, so that there is much reason to assert that
this, like so many other controversies which may arise over the
interpretation of the constitution, is a legal question. 23 The theory
of the courts is doubtless that back of the power to declare laws
unconstitutional. "The constitution is the supreme law of the land,
and the courts are the special guardians of that law." The Su-
preme Court may set aside any unconstitutional act of Congress
or of the president, and reverse its own and the decisions of the
lower courts where the interpretation was erroneous. From this
it follows that where there is a failure to follow the regular
mode of amendment prescribed in article five, the courts may
regard the procedure as null and void.
The courts of the United States in both the states and the
nation have taken cognizance of an increasing range of cases. In
international law constant efforts are being made to reduce the
scope of political questions. In the state courts there has been
an increasing development of judicial control over the amending
2OThe 11th, 14th, and 16th amendments operated to nullify previous
decisions. Such would also be the effect of the Child Labor Amend-
ment. The l1th amendment operated retroactively.2 1Worman v. Hagen, (1893) 78 Md. 409, 28 Atl. 397. In State v.
Swift, (1880) 69 Ind. 512, two judges dissenting, it appears that the
court assumed the validity of a statute interpreted to allow the gover-
nor to ascertain the adoption of an amendment; in Rice v. Palmer,
(1906) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396, .there is dictum that a statute could
establish a special tribunal for the purpose. Jameson is of the view
that Congress alone has the power to pass on amendments except in
suits between individuals. Jameson, Constitutional Conventions 626.22McConaughy v. Secretary of State, (1909) 106 Minn. 392, 119
N. W. 408. But this seems improper since the courts are bound by the
constitution as well as the other departments of the government.23 1n practice, Congress has several times in effect decided on the
meaning of article V. In resolutions it has asserted that the approval
of an amendment by the president is unnecessary, that two thirds of a
quorum of each house of Congress is the majority required for propos-
ing amendments, that the 14th amendment was ratified, and that states
may not withdraw their ratifications.
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process. Hollinrgsworth v. Virginia24 seems to have been the
first case, either national or state, in which the validity of an
amendment was passed on. But as has been stated no attempt
was made to show that the issue was a political one; the question
moreover was simply one as to the procedure of the amendment;
and the court upheld the validity of the amendment. In 1836
the first state case was decided upholding the right of the courts
to inquire into the validity of amendments. But the opinion of
the court was brief, and like the prior federal case upheld the
validity of the amendment.2 5 In 1849 the federal Supreme Court
asserted in dictum that the question was political."0  Until the
recent cases on the eighteenth and nineteenth amendments, this
was the only pronouncement of the court on the subject, so that
if there had been no intervening circumstances, the court might
have adhered to its view in that case. This circumstance has been
the constantly increasing litigation in the state courts over the
validity of amendments. In 1854 the Alabama court in Collier v.
Friersoni- asserted that it was a judicial question and held an
amendment invalid. The case is notable for the fact that it is the
first case before 1880 holding an amendment unconstitutional. In
1856 the Mississippi supreme court held the question a judicial
one.28 In 1864, however, the Maryland court took the view that
it was a political question.2 9 In 1876 the Minnesota court re-
garded it as judicial.3" In 1880 only about seven cases had arisen
in which the validity of an amendment was attacked in the courts.
Up to 1890 about twenty such cases had arisen. But since that
date a large number of cases have been decided.
The decisions have been virtually unanimous to the effect that
the question is judicial, and the state courts now exercise super-
vision over every step of the amending process. Luther v. Borden
24(1798) 3 DalU. (U.S.) 378, 1 L. Ed. 644.
25State v. McBride, (1836) 4 Mo. 303.2 Luther v. Borden (1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581.
-'(1854) 24 Ala. 100.28Green v. Weller, (1856) 32 Miss. 650.29 Miles v. Bradford, (1864) 22 Aid. 170. The same view has since
been taken in State v. Swift, (1880) 69 Ind. 512, power of political
department inferred from a statute; Beck, J., dissenting in Koehler v.
Hill, (1883) 60 Iowa 543, 568; Van Syckel, J., dissenting in Bott v.
Wurts, (1897) 61 N. J. L 160, 38 Atl. 848; .McCulloch, J., dissenting in
Rice v. Palmer, (1906) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396, pointing out that if
the question is judicial the validity of an amendment is never definitely
settled.3
°Dayton v. St. Paul, (1876) 22 Minn. 400.
.1JINNESOTI L'IW REVIEIV
was discussed by many of the courts, and the limited holding of
that case was precisely defined." With such an historical back-
ground, it is not peculiar then that the Supremo Court of the
United States when it came to passing on the eighteenth and nine-
teenth amendments was prepared to view the issue as judicial.'-
The rule that the validity of an amendment is a judicial ques-
tion does not solve all the difficulties that arise, however. The
legality of an amendment when analyzed may present two prob-
lems. First, was the procedure prescribed in the amendmcnt
clause of the constitution regularly followed? Second, granted
that the procedure was regular, is the amendment valid in its
substance? The vast majority of cases have involved the first
point, and have regarded it as unquestionably a judicial question.
The number of cases dealing with the second issue has been small.
and the outcome has not been so decisive. In Hollingsz..orth 1,
31In that case two rival governments were in armed conflict- tile
validity of a constitution, not an amendment, was in issue, and the
opinion was therefore dictum; federal jurisdiction was involved as to
the validity of a state constitution, and not of a federal amendment;
the constitution of Rhode Island provided no mode of amendment.
There are dicta in a few cases that when the amendment relates to
the existence, power, or functions of the courts, the question is
political. Koehler v. Hill, (1883) 60 Iowa 543; State v. Powell, (1900)
77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927, 48 L. R. A. 652.
32The trend of opinion as to the federal constitution has not always
been so clear, however. In White v. Hart, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.)
646, 20 L. Ed. 685, the court in dictum intimated that the validity of
the Civil War amendments was a political question. In Smith v.
Good, (C.C.R.I. 1888) 34 Fed. 204, Colt, Circuit Judge, asserted that
the validity of an amendment is a political question, and cited Luther
v. Borden as controlling. But in Knight v. Shelton, (C.C.Ark. 1905)
134 Fed. 423, also involving the validity of a state amendment, the
question was regarded as judicial. In Anderson v. Myers. (C.C.Md.
1910) 182 Fed. 223, the court passed on the validity of the 15th
amendment and seems to have assumed that the substance of an
amendment was a judicial question. In Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D.C.N.J.
1920) 264 Fed. 186, involving the 18th amendment, it is suggested that
only the political department can declare an amendment void for
violating alleged implied limitations as to substance. In the National
Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 381, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed.
946, the solicitor general argued that both the ratification and scope of
amendments were political. Former Attorney General Albert F. Pills-
bury of Maine argued in 1909 that the scope is a political question.
The Fifteenth Amendment, 1909 Maine St. Bar Ass'n 17, 26. Wayne 1.
Wheeler urged in 1920 that the validity of the 18th amendment was a
political question. The Constitutionality of the Constitution Is Not a
Justiciable Question, 90 Cent. L. J. 152. Recently the peculiar view has
been offered that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to uphold an
amendment taking away reserved powers of the states. Stevenson,
States' Rights and National Prohibition 99-118. There is an excellent
discussion bv Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, (1921) 30
Yale L. J. 321.
TETE FEDERAL AMENDING POWl'ER
Virginic33 the issue was as to the necessity of the approval of an
amendment by the president, thus presenting a question of pro-
cedure only. Thus when the recent federal cases arose there was
no precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States for passing on the content of an amendment. The court,
in fact, passed on questions of substance, but upheld the amend-
ments. Thus the Supreme Court seems committed to the doctrine
that both the procedure and substance of amendments are judicial
questions. It is important to note, however, that an amendment
to the federal constitution has as yet never been held void on
either ground.
Relatively few attacks have been made on the substance of
amendments in the state courts. Apparently the first case in which
this question was directly raised was that of Livermore z. IVaite3
by the California court in 1894. That court held that an amend-
ment was void in substance because certain of its provisions were
to become operative at the will of certain officials mentioned in
it, although it was regularly voted on by the people. Neither the
federal nor the state constitution imposed such a restriction and
it seems that it was one "discovered by the California courts."
Two years later the Missouri court took the opposite view in a
case involving similar facts.3 5 Where the constitution is silent
as to the scope of an amendment, the view of the state courts
appears to be that the courts may not pass on the character of
the amendment.36 Where the state constitutions contain limita-
33(1798) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 378, 1 L. Ed. 644.
34(1894) 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424, 25 L. R. A. 312. The court
suggests that the power of the legislature to propose amendments is
much less than that of a convention, and that a convention is subject
only to the constitution of the United States. The distinction appears
unsound, however, as a convention is merely a legal agent of the state
for the purpose of amendment just as the legislature is. The court
also contends that an amendment which if adopted would be inoperative.
or contingent on the acts of a group of individuals, is invalid. But if
the people have imposed no such limitations there would seem to be
no good reason why such an amendment may not be proposed.35Edwards v. Lesueur, (1896) 132 Mo. 410, 33 S. W. 1130. But in
State v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. XAr. 689 an amendment was
held void as being legislative in character, and also because it was
operative for only ten years; but in dictum the court said that a
proposed prohibition amendment would be valid, since prohibition
was subject to permanent as well as temporary regulation. This
decision was probably a political one.
a6State v. Swift, (1880) 69 Ind. 512; Prohibitory Amendment Cases
(1881) 24 Kan. 700: State v. Thorson, (1896) 9 S. D. 149. 68 N. W.
202, 33 L. R. A. 582: People v. Sours. (1903) 31 Colo. 369: Frantz v.
Autry, (1907) 18 Okla. 561, 91 Pac. 193; Louisiana Ry. & Navigation
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tions on the scope of amendments, it would seem proper for the
courts to determine whether the content is proper. 7  Such limita-
tions should be found within the amending clause, and the other
articles of the constitution should not be viewed as limitations.
Thus the bill of rights and the amending clause are themselves
subject to alteration unless expressly forbidden to be altered.
Most state constitutions contain no such limitations, however, and
the problem therefore seldom arises, as the doctrine of implied
limits on the nature of amendments has not been adopted by the
state courts.
The constitution of the United States, however, contains an
express restriction on the nature of amendments. No state may
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its con-
sent. Prior to 1808 no amendment could be made abolishing the
slave trade, or imposing a direct tax without apportionment. Since
that date, unless the courts adopt the view that there are implied
limitations, the only criterion of character an amendment has had
to meet is that it must not violate the equal suffrage clause. The
absence of any limitations as to form or substance is shown in the
cases of the eleventh and the eighteenth amendments. The
eleventh amendment operated retroactively. The eighteenth
amendment by its own provision was not to go into effect until
a year after its ratification, and was to be inoperative unless
ratified within seven years after its submission by Congress to the
states28 Though the eighteenth and nineteenth amendments were
attacked as void in substance, the contentions were rejected. 5
So far no implied limitations have been admitted, but the Supreme
Court is ready to hear arguments as to the content, thus clearly
regarding it as a judicial question.
Co. v. Madere, -(1909) 124 La. 635, 50 So. 609; State v. Fulton, (1919)
99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N. E. 172; Switzer v. State, (1921) 103 Ohio 306,
133 N. E. 552, suggesting that a federal amendment may be! invalid
for indefiniteness; Browne v. City of New York, (1925) 241 N. Y. 96,
149 N. E. 211.
37The Alabama constitution, article 18, sec. 284, forbids the change
of representation in the legislature on any other than a population basis.
Article 17, sec. 2, of the Michigan constitution forbids the use of the
popular initiative to amend the amending clause itself.3sSee Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 Sup. Ct. 510, 65
L. Ed. 944; Druggan v. Anderson, (1925) 269 U. S. 36, 46 Sup. Ct,
14, 70, L. Ed. 151."
aONational Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 386, 40 Sup. Ct.
486, 64 L. Ed. 946; Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U. S. 130, 42 Sup. Ct.
217, 66 L. Ed. 505.
THE FEDERAL AMENDING POIIER
The validity of a federal amendment appears to be open to
attack collaterally and perhaps directly, at least in the absence of
any judicial decisions to the contrary. There would, however,
seem to be some diffiulty in making a direct attack, such as would
not be experienced in the case of an amendment to a state con-
stitution, and in fact the legality has generally been assailed
collaterally.40 A federal amendment involves simply the pro-
posal by Congress and the consent of the state legislatures. A
state amendment involves the constitutionally designated action
of various officials apart from the legislature and the people so
that an opportunity is furnished at various stages to attack it.
A federal amendment is not open to attack prior to its passage
since neither Congress nor the state legislatures can be enjoined
when engaged in legislating or amending."1 The attack would
have to come after the amendment had gone into force, and it
would seem a difficult matter to find a successful method of
40 1n Fairchild v. Hughes, (1922) 258 U. S. 126, 42 Sup. Ct. 274, 60
L. Ed. 490, it was held that the general right of a citizen to have the
government administered according to law and the public moneys not
wasted does not entitle him to institute in the federal courts a suit
to secure by indirection, a determination whether an amendment about
to be adopted will be valid. The action was in the form of a bill in
equity, but was held not to 'be a case within the meaning of article
III, sec. 2. See also, State i . Cox, (D.C. Ohio 1919) 257 Fed. 344;
United States v. Colby, (C.C.D.C. 1920) 265 Fed. 998. In Hanley v.
Wetmore, (1886) 15 R. I. 386, 6 At. 777, the court refused to make
a declaratory decree against the canvassing board that a state amend-
ment was improperly adopted, on the ground that there was no one
on whom the decree would be binding, and that there was no showing
of a right
41State v. Thorson, (1896) 9 S. D. 149, 68 N. W. 202, 33 L. R. A.
582; People v. Mills, (1902) 30 Colo. 262, 70 Pac. 322; Frantz v.
Autry, (1907) 18 Okla. 561, 91 Pac. 193. Threadgill v. Cross, (1910)
26 Okla. 403, 109 Pac. 558, 138 Am. St. Rep. 964; State v. Board, (1919)
44 N. D. 126, 172 N. W. 80; State v. Marcolin, (1922) 105 Ohio 570,
138 N. E. 881; McAlister v. State, (1923) 95 Okla. 200, 219 Pac. 134,
33 A. L. R. 1370; Hamilton v. Secretary of State, (1924) 227 Mich.
111, 198 N. W. 843.
Contra: Wells v. Bain, (1873) 75 Pa. 39, 15 Am. Rep. 563: Hatch
v. Stoneman, (1885) 66 Cal. 633; Livermore v. Waite, (1894) 102 Cal.
113; Edwards v. Lesueur, (1896) 132 Mo. 410, 441; Peonle v. Curry.
(1900) 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516; Holmberg v. Jones, (1901) 7 Idaho
752, 65 Pac. 563; State v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 689.
two judges dissenting; State v. Alderson. (1914) 49 Mont. 387. 142
Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1914B 39; Tax Commission Case. (1923) 68 .Mont.
450, 219 Pac. 817; State v. Hall, (1917) 35 N. D. 34, 159 N. XV. 281
seems not to have been followed in State v. Board, (1919) 44 N. D.
126, 172 N. W. 80.
For general principles, see 'Mississippi v. Johnson. (1866) 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 475. 18 L. Ed. 437; Clayton v. Calhoun, (1886) 76 Ga. 270;
Dodd, Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 228-232.
384 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
assailing it directly. The Supreme Court refuses to act unless
there is an actual case or controversy pending. As a matter of
fact, the recent federal amendments have been adjudicatcd in
cases where the defendant has set up their invalidity as a defense,
or where the plaintiff brings an action and asserts that the amend-
ments do not bar his action since they are void.
